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Abstract
I investigate the inuence of the union structure on rms envi-
ronmental technological choice when the unions care for the environ-
mental protection. Specically, I compare the decentralised with the
centralised structure under a Cournot duopoly. I show that the decen-
tralised structure could always provide higher incentives to the rms
for the adoption of a better (less polluting) technology. In addition,
the rms prefer the decentralised unionisation than the centralised
although the unions prefer the centralised structure. Furthermore,
there is an inverse U-shape relation between the rms emissions and
the size of the market. Finally, the emissions could be less under
the centralised case compared to the decentralised for relatively low
markets size.
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1 Introduction
Recently a small but increasing number of social studies recognises the envi-
ronmentalism as a strong motivation which could inuence the trade unions
decisions and strategies. As Obach (1999) reports Starting with the wave
of environmentalism that began in the late 1960s, we see that a number of
unions were supportive of this environmental mobilizationand according to
Silverman (2006) Union environmentalism is based in the particularist pur-
pose of unions to protect members and in their more-universalist purpose to
promote class mobilization based on solidarity. Furthermore, in the litera-
ture there are examples from the real world experience with respect to the
unions environmentalism as well as trade unions alliances with the environ-
mental groups for common targets (e.g. Obach, 1999, 2002, 2004; Rose, 2004
and Mayer, 2009).2
Therefore, the strong evidence for the union environmentalism could
drives the economists to ask How the trade unions could react to the rms
level of pollution when the organised workers participate in the production
process? How the unions environmental interest could inuence the rmsde-
cision for the technological choice, the level of the production and the prots?
What will happen to the unionswages and utility? Which unions structure
could provide the lower level of emissions? The aim of this research is to
explore and to shed more light on the previous issues.
In the economic literature the inuence of the trade union structures
on the rms technological choice is a main research issue in labour and
technological economics and has been analysed extensively.3 However, both
2An other important evidence for the interest of the labour community for
the environmental protection is the document from the United Nations Environ-
mental Program (UNEP) and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) un-
der the title Labour and the Environment: A Natural Synergy. Available at
http://www.unep.org/labour_environment/PDFs/UNEP-labour-env-synergy.pdf
3For some examples see Ulph and Ulph, 1998 and Dobson, 1994 and for a survey see
Menezes-Filho and Van Reenen, 2003.
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empirical and theoretical studies have given ambiguous results with respect to
the dimensions of the unionisations inuence on rmstechnology, innovation
or R&D. For example a strong negative relation has been reported in North
America between the unionisation and innovation but the European studies
have not conrmed this strong relation (e.g. Menezes-Filho and Van Reenen,
2003; Haucap and Wey, 2004 and Manasakis and Petrakis, 2009).
In this paper, following the recent theoretical studies on oligopoly, union
structure and innovation, I explore the rmstechnological choice under the
case of decentralised unions (independent union for each rm) and centralised
union (industry-wide union) in a Cournot market. However, contrary to the
literature, I introduce the case of the unions direct interest for environmen-
tal protection, which has been neglected, although it is an essential issue for
environmental economics and policy.4 I show that, the decentralised struc-
ture could always provide higher incentives to the rms for the adoption of
a better (less polluting) technology. Also, although rms prefer the decen-
tralised unionisation (because the prots are higher) than the centralised,
the unions prefer the industry-wide union case (where the unions utility is
higher). Furthermore, the level of the rmsemissions depends on the size
of the market, therefore, it could be lower under the centralised structure
(compared the decentralised) for relatively small market size. Therefore, this
study on the one hand, could partially cover the gap in the literature with
respect to the environmental issue and the role of the trade unions. On the
other hand, may encourage further theoretical and empirical investigation
for the relation between the union structure, the environmental issue and
the technological choice or innovation.
The model is based on a duopolistic market where rms compete à la
4Also, for the relation between the unionised workers and the application of the envi-
ronmental policy see for example Stavins, 1998 and Fredriksson and Gaston, 1999. Fur-
thermore, in the literature there are cases where the unions opposed to the environmental
policies under the threat of higher unemployment. However, it is less interesting to focus
on the case of trade unions without environmental interest given that already exists in the
literature.
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Cournot and both rms are unionised. In the same spirit, Ulph and Ulph
(1989) use a duopolistic model where each rm faces an independent union.
In their model the rms participate in a patent race to gain a new technol-
ogy (tournament model) where only one rm could use the new technology
(innovator). They conclude that the strength of the union and the timing of
the rms-unions negotiations could discourage the rmsincentives for R&D
investment. Also in a similar study, Ulph and Ulph (1994) compare the Right
to Manage case (bargaining over wages) with the E¢ cient Bargaining case
(bargaining over wages and employment). In this model however, like in the
previous, there are only decentralised unions and the rms participate on a
tournament race for a labour-saving technology where only one rm could
be the innovator.
Also Tauman and Weiss (1987) following a Cournot market, consider the
role of the unionisation on the rmsdecision for the adoption of labour-
saving technology. In their model two rms; one unionised and the second
non-unionised, compete in the product market as well as in the tournament
race. The authors conclude that the unionised rm has more incentives to
adopt a new technology in order to defend against higher costs (wages) from
the unionised workers. However they assume that only one rm is unionised.
Additionally, Calabuig and Gonzalez-Maestre (2002) focus on the struc-
ture of the union -centralised and decentralised- and the inuence on the
rmstechnological choice for labour-saving technology. The authors follow-
ing the Right to Manage bargaining model, analyse three possible technolog-
ical choices; only one rm innovates, both rms innovate, both rms choose
not to innovate. They conclude that the centralisation may provide stronger
incentives to the rms for innovation, but this argument is strong under a
small market size. In their model there are only two possible levels of tech-
nologies; the old and the new, but the rms face a linear cost function. Con-
trary to Calabuig and Gonzalez-Maestre (2002), I assume the existence of a
spectrum of available technologies where the rmscost function is quadratic.
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Furthermore, Haucap and Wey (2004) analyse three possible union struc-
tures. Specically, they consider the case of the decentralised unions, the case
of the coordinationwhere the single union sets individual wages (wages
discrimination) to each rm and nally the centralised union where there
is only one wage (uniform) for all rms in the industry. The rms com-
pete in R&D tournament race for a labour-saving technology. They show
that the rmsincentives for investment or innovation are larger under the
centralisation. Also the decentralised case encourages more innovation than
coordination. Moreover, decentralisation o¤ers higher levels of employment
to the unions than coordination where centralisation o¤ers a lower employ-
ment level. Therefore the innovation incentives are non-monotone in the
degree of the centralisation. In their article, as in Ulph and Ulph (1989,
1994), the model is based on a patent race for labour-saving technology and
with one innovator.
Recently, Manasakis and Petrakis (2009) explore the incentives of the
rms to invest on cost-reducing R&D under di¤erent union structure. The
authors compare the R&D investment with the presence of the R&D spillovers
when the two rms do not cooperate in technology and when they cooperate
under the form of Research Joint Ventures (RJV). They argue that if the
spillovers are low and under the absence of the cooperation, the centralised
union (with uniform wage) encourages more R&D investment than the de-
centralised structure. Besides, in the case of the RJV the incentives for R&D
investment are always higher under the decentralisation structure than under
the industry-wide union. However, in my study I focus on the case without
the existence of the spillovers and on the use of the environmental technology.
The previous papers, except the technical di¤erences and characteristics
with this study, have neglected the environmental issue and as a result the
unionsreaction against pollution and their possible inuence on the rms
anti-pollution technological choice. Specically, I assume that both rms
are unionised. Like in Calabuig and Gonzalez-Maestre (2002), I compare the
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decentralised with the centralised structure (wage discrimination). The rms
compete in the output market only and both can adopt an environmental
(anti-polluting) technology from a spectrum of available technologies. Also
the union(s)utility function is characterised by the environmental concern
because the unionsmay have a degree of environmentalismor because the
unionised workers would be harmed from the rmsemissions.5
Following the timing of the game from Haucap and Wey (2004), the rms
decision for the technological choice, which is a long run decision, is included
in the rst stage. Then the rms negotiate with the union(s) for the wages,
which could happen in a shorter time and nally in the third stage the
rms choose output, a much shorter periods decision. I solve the game
by backwards induction to analyse the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
(SPNE).
The next section includes the solution of the models for the two possi-
ble cases of union structure; the decentralised and centralised. The results
from the two cases are compared in the section 3. Finally discussion and
conclusions are in section 4.
2 The model
The model is made as simple as possible in order to focus on the e¤ect of the
unions structure on the level of the emissions. Therefore, I consider a classic
Cournot oligopoly model with two unionised rms indicated by i; j = 1; 2
with i 6= j and a homogeneous product. Following the usual assumption the
rms produce with constant returns to scale qi = Li where qi; Li is the rms
i output and labour respectively. The price in the product market (inverse
demand function) is given by p = a   qi   qj where a > 0 is the size of the
market. Also ki 2 (0; 1] is the level of the rms i anti-pollution technology
5For example, the CO2 emissions from the rms could inuence negatively the workers
health.
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which is more e¢ cient against the pollution (cleaner or greener) for values
close to 0 and less e¢ cient (dirtier or browner) for values near to 1. Like in
the real market, I assume the absence of the perfect technology which can
stop all the emissions from the production. Therefore, ki > 0. Furthermore,
following Asproudis and Gil-Molto (2009) the technological cost is quadratic,
reects the diminishing returns to investment and is equal to (1 ki)2. Also
the parameter  > 0 implies that the adoption of a less polluting (greener)
technology involves higher cost to the rms than the adoption of a more
polluting (browner) technology. For the sake of simplicity and without loss
of generality, I assume that rms do not incur any other production costs.
Thus, the total cost for the rm i becomes Ci = wiLi + (1  ki)2, where wi
is the level of the wages set by the union to the rm i. That is, the rms
prots are given by
i = pqi   Ci (1)
Besides, the unions will set the level of the wages and then the rms
have the right to decide the level of employment according to the Right
to Manage model.6 Furthermore, I start from the usual utility equation
Ui = wiLi (see Oswald, 1985; Booth, 1995 and Dobson, 1994) and from the
assumption that, the unions have total power to set wages but the rms
have the bargaining power to decide the number of workers (e.g. Manasakis
and Petrakis, 2009).78 Additionally, I assume that the reservation wage or
the wage that the workers could gain in a competitive industry is equal to
zero (e.g. Lommerud et al., 2005; Mukherjee et al., 2007 and Manasakis
and Petrakis, 2009). Finally, I hypothesize that each union cares for the
6For some studies with respect to the Right to Manage model see Nickell and Andrews,
1983; Espinoza and Rhee, 1989; Lopez and Naylor, 2004 and Mukherjee, 2008.
7This is the Monopoly Union model (Dunlop, 1944) a special case of the Right to
Manage model. See also Oswald, 1982 and 1985 and Petrakis and Vlassis, 2004.
8Another usual assumption is that all the workers are organised members, they are
homogeneous and they have equal opportunity to be employees (e.g. Oswald, 1985).
7
environmental protection (or for the unionised membershealth which could
be harmed from the rmspollution) and reacts against the rms emissions.
Hence each trade union objective is to reduce the level of the environmental
damage (through the rms damage function) which emanates from the rms
pollution.9 For the rm i the damage equation or the workers disutility
from the pollution (see Eshel and Sexton, 2009) is equal to Di(yi) = eyi, an
increasing function of the emissions. Also, e is the damages parameter for
each unit of emissions or pollution (e.g. the environmental damage for each
tonne of CO2), therefore the marginal damage with respect to the emissions
is constant.10 Also, given that k > 0 then always e > 0. The yi indicates
rms i level of emissions where yi = kiqi. Thus, each rms level of emissions
depends on the greennessof the technology and the level of production. So,
I introduce the damage function in the trade unions utility function and
therefore the equation becomes Ui = wiLi  D = wiLi   eyi.
I explore two possible structures of the unions. In the rst case there is one
union for each rm, the decentralised case, where initially the rms choose
technology simultaneously. Then, the unions set the wages simultaneously
following a sequential Right to Manage bargaining model and nally the rms
decide simultaneously on production (and employment).11 The last stage is
common with the second case where there is only one union, the centralised
union, which will set wages for both rms.
There are some common conditions for the two models, which are neces-
sary in order to be sure that the results are the optima and to be compared
9A possible extension of this approach is the case where each union cares for the total
level of the emissions or the emissions at industry level, then each union will deal with the
total damage function or the damage which emanates from the pollution of both rms.
10For linear damage or constant marginal damage function see Kennedy (1999), Kennedy
and Laplante (1999) and Requate (2005). An other possible extension of the model is the
using of a quadratic damage equation. However, the results are much more ambiguous
and complex.
11In Calabuig and Gonzalez-Maestre (2002) the unions bargain simultaneously with the
rms over the wages. In my model the bargaining is sequential, so the union(s) set the
wages and then the rms decide for the level of the employment (or output).
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under the same spectrum of values.
Conditions: 14:46
e
> a > e; 9 > e2; ae2 < 4:82(a+2e); ae2 < 9(a+e)
2.1 Stage three: Firms decide on the output
After some manipulations the rmsprots equations become
i = (a  qi   qj)qi   wiqi   (ki   1)2 (2)
where following the standard calculation of the First Order Condition (FOC)
each rms reaction function becomes qRFi = (a   qj   wi)=2. Solving si-
multaneously the equations of the reaction functions the Cournot - Nash
equilibrium output, employment and prots respectively are given by
qi = L

i =
a  2wi + wj
3
;
i = (q

i )
2   (ki   1)2 (3)
Note that the equilibrium output is decreasing in its rms wage but is in-
creasing in the rivals rm level of wage and as usual is increasing in the size
of the market.
This stage is common stage for the two possible union structure, decen-
tralised and centralised. In the next subsection I analyse the model for the
case of the decentralisation where each rm will bargain with one union over
the wages.
2.2 Decentralised unions
2.2.1 Stage two: Unions set wages
In this stage the two unions will move together and will set the level of the
wages for each rm (bargaining at the rm level). For the decentralised case
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the unionsutility is given by
UDi = wiLi   eyi (4)
and after the substitution of the equilibrium output (and employment) the
utility function becomes UDi = (wi   eki)qi . From the calculation the FOC
I obtain12
@UDi
@wi
=
1
3
(a+ 2eki   4wi + wj) = 0 (5)
where @
2UDi
@wi@wj
> 0, thus, the wages are strategic complements. Like in Petrakis
and Vlassis (2004) if the union j sets higher wages to rm j the level of the
output from the specic rm will reduced (
@qj
@wj
< 0) but rm i will produce
more ( @q

i
@wj
< 0). So it becomes more attractive for the union i to set higher
wages to rms i when the rival rm deals with higher wages from the union
j.13
Solving simultaneously the FOCs the equilibrium wage is14
wDi =
1
15
(5a+ 2e(4ki + kj)) (6)
where the level of the wage setting from each union depends positively on
the rmsdecision for the greenness of the technological choice. Simply, the
better (with less emissions) the technology adopted by both rms, the less
will be, the level of the wages demanded by the unions.15
12The SOC is  4=3, therefore the utility function is a risk-averse utility (@2UDi =@wD
2
i <
0, see also Booth, 1995).
13For example, the union i will set higher wages when the union j set higher wages to
the rm j. Then the rm i may produce the same output as before the increasing of the
rival rms level of wages (rm j). So, the number of the workers in rm i could be the
same but with higher wages, which means that the rm i nally will not produce more
but will pay for higher wages.
14It is interesting to observe that, solving the FOC with respect to the wage the reaction
function of the unions will be wRFi =
1
4 (a+ 2eki + wj). Hence, each union will decide for
the level of the wage taking into account the other unions decision for the wage.
15The wages are increasing due to the rent-seeking behavior. The union seeks higher
level of wages when the rms returns from an investment become higher.
10
Proposition 1 The more polluting the rmstechnology (at industry level)
is, the higher the level of the wages demanded by the unions.
2.2.2 Stage one: Firms choose technology
In this stage the rms will decide on the level of technology given the de-
centralised unionsdecisions for the level of wages. After the substitution of
(6) to (3); the equilibrium output, employment and prots respectively are
equal to
qDi = L
D
i =
2
45
(5a  7eki + 2ekj);
Di = (q
D
i )
2   (ki   1)2 (7)
Also note that, on the one hand, the equilibrium output is decreasing in its
rms technological choice (@q
D
i
@ki
< 0). Thus, the production is increasing
if the rm adopts a greener technology. On the other hand, the equilibrium
output for each rm is increasing in the rival rms technological choice
(
@qDi
@kj
> 0). Hence, the output is increasing if the rival rm chooses a dirty
than if will adopt a greentechnology.
From the equilibrium prots I calculate the derivative with respect to the
technology and solving these equations simultaneously, I obtain the rms
optimum technological choice16
k
D
i =
ae  14:46
e2   14:46 (8)
where the optimum technology is positive given the necessary conditions
of the model. Also, given that k
D
i is decreasing in the size of the market
(@k
D
i
@a
< 0), this implies that the bigger the markets size, the greener (less
16The FOC is @

i
@ki
=   2(140ae+2025(ki 1)+28e2(2kj 7ki))2025 and the SOC is @
2i
@k2i
= 392e
2
2025  
2 which is negative given the conditions of the model.
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polluting) the adopted technology is. Actually, the increasing of the market
will raise the production of the rms (@q
D
i
@a
> 0) but this implies the adoption
of a better technology (@q
D
i
@ki
< 0). Furthermore, the optimum technology
is decreasing in the parameter  or as usual, the increasing adoption costs
discourage the rmsto adopt a better technology (@k
D
i
@
> 0).
Thus, after the necessary substitutions the optimum prots are

D
i =
784(a  e)2(10:33   e2)
(28e2   405)2 (9)
and the optimum output and employment is
qDi = L
D
i =
3:21(a  e)
14:46   e2 (10)
Therefore the level of the emissions from each rm is given by
yDi =
2520(a  e)(14:46   ae)
(28e2   405)2 (11)
Interestingly, the derivative of the emissions with respect to the size of the
market @y
D
i
@a
could be positive or negative but depends on the markets size.
Specically, there is a critical value for the size of the market aDcv =
e2+14:46
2e
according to which for a < aDcv the emissions are increasing in the size of
the market @y
D
i
@a
> 0 and for the opposite case the opposite holds. The
intuition for this is the existence of the two e¤ects. Particularly, on the
one hand the increase in the markets size drives the rms to produce more
(
@qDi
@a
> 0), hence, the level of the emissions becomes higher (direct e¤ect).
On the other hand, under the increase of the markets size (and the rise of the
production) the rms will adopt a better (less polluting) technology because
then the production is rising, (@k
D
i
@a
< 0 and @q
D
i
@ki
< 0). Thus, the level of
the emissions is reducing (indirect e¤ect). That is, for size of the market less
than the critical value the rst e¤ect dominates the second. However for size
of the market larger than the critical value the second e¤ect dominates the
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rst. Diagrammatically, an inverse U-shape could characterise the level of
the emissions with the size of the market.
Proposition 2 There is an inverse U-shape curve between the level of pol-
lution and the size of the market.
Furthermore the wages for each union will be
wDi =
4:82(a+ 2e)   ae2
14:46   e2 (12)
where each unions optimum utility becomes
U
D
i =
12150(a  e)22
(28e2   405)2 (13)
2.3 Centralised unions
2.3.1 Stage two: Union sets wages
In the case of the centralised union, only one union, the central union, set
wages
UC = wiLi + wjLj   e(yi + yj) (14)
and after the substitution of the equilibrium output the utility equation is
equal to UC = (wi   eki)qi + (wj   ekj)qj , so the FOC is17
@UCi
@wi
=
1
3
(a+ 2eki   ekj   4wi + 2wj) (15)
and the Nash equilibriumwages after the simultaneously solving for the FOCs
will become
wCi =
1
2
(a+ eki) (16)
17Again the SOC is  4=3, so risk-averse utility.
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where similar to the decentralised case, the level of the wages under cen-
tralisation depends positively on the rms technology but contrary to the
decentralised structure depends only on each rms level of technology and
not on the both rmstechnological choice.
Proposition 3 The wage set by the union is increasing in each rms tech-
nological choice.
2.3.2 Stage one: Firms choose technology
After the substitution of the previous centralised equilibrium values in qi ; L

i ;

i
the rmsoutput, employment and prots respectively, are:
qCi = L
C
i =
1
6
(a  2eki + ekj);
Ci = (q
D
i )
2   (ki   1)2 (17)
where, like in the case of decentralisation, the equilibrium output (or em-
ployment) is decreasing in ki and increasing in kj. Again solving the system
of the equations from the FOCs, the rms optimum technological choice for
the case of the centralised union is18
k
C
i =
ae  18
e2   18 (18)
Again, the rmstechnological choice under the unionised structure is de-
creasing in the size of the market (@k
C
i
@a
< 0), so it becomes greener and is
rising in the parameter  (@k
C
i
@
> 0), thus, it becomes more polluting. Hence,
after the substitution of the optimum technology to the protsequation, the
optimum prots under the centralised union are
18The FOCs are equal @
C
i
@ki
= 19 ( ae   18(ki   1) + e2(2ki   kj)) also the SOC is
@2Ci
@k2i
= 29 (e
2   9) which is negative given the initial conditions of the model.
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
C
i =
(a  e)2(9   e2)
(e2   18)2 (19)
and the output (and employment) equilibrium is
qCi =
3(a  e)
18   e2 (20)
therefore each rms level of emissions is
yCi =
3(a  e)(18   ae)
(e2   18)2 (21)
and like in the case of decentralisation, the optimum level of emissions have
an inverse U-shape relation with the size of the market, where the critical
value now is aCcv =
e2+18
2e
. Therefore, there are two e¤ects; the increasing
of the emissions which emanate from the increasing of the output and the
reduction of the emissions which originating from the adoption of a better,
less-polluting, technology. Again, the level of the optimum emissions is in-
creasing for markets size less than the critical size (rst e¤ect dominates
the second) and is decreasing for marketssize larger than the critical value
(second e¤ect dominates the rst). Also, the wages from each rm will be
wCi =
9(a+ e)   ae2
18   e2 (22)
and the unions utility equal to:
U
C
i =
54(a  e)22
(e2   18)2 (23)
3 Comparison
In this section I will compare the optimum results from the two cases. It is
necessary to note that the results are positive for the given conditions of the
15
models.
3.1 Firmsoutput (employment) and wages
Lets start from the rmsoutput (or employment). For the decentralised
case the rmsoutput is qDi and for the centralised is q
C
i where the q
D
i >
qCi . Then, the level of the production under the bargaining at the rms
level is higher than under the single industry-wide union bargaining.19 From
the employeesviewpoint the level of the employment is higher under the
decentralised structure than under centralisation which is a typical result in
the case of the bargaining over wages (RTM).
Moreover, another typical result is the higher level of wages under central-
isation compared to the decentralisation structure (wCi > w
D
i ).
20 However,
the unions are characterised by a risk-averse utility, thus, they care for the
number of employees (which is the same with the output) as well as for the
level of the wages. These objectives are obvious through the use of com-
parative statics. Specically, under decentralisation there is the same critical
value of the damage parameter eDcv =
1
14
(14a p7
p
28a2   405) for the case
of the optimum decentralised wages and output (employment). Particularly,
for 0 < e < eDcv, the optimum wages are increasing but the optimum output
is decreasing in the parameter e and for eDcv < e < a the wages are decreasing
and the production (or employment) is increasing in e.21 Simply there is an
inverse U-shape relation between wages and the damage parameter and a
U-shape between output (employment) and the parameter e as it is shown
19After the calculation of the di¤erence between qDi   qCi and solving with respect to
e2= the result is qDi > q
C
i if e
2= < 67:5 but from the conditions e2= is always less than
9, thus the decentralised optimum output is higher than the centralised output.
20The centralisation gives more bargaining power to the union to set higher wages as a
monopolist in the labour market.
21For the case of the decentralisation the derivatives of the optimum output and wages
with respect to damage parameters respectively are @q
D
i
@e =
90(56ae 28e2 405)
(28e2 405)2 ;
@wDi
@e =
270(28e2 56ae+405)
(28e2 405)2 . Also for the case of the centralisation the critical values of the damage
parameter is eCcv = a 
p
a2   18.
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in the next gures.
Figure 1: U-shape between q and e
cve e
q a
Figure 2: Inverse U-shape between w and e
cve e
aw
The intuition behind this is that, on the one hand the increasing of the
damage parameter for values less than the critical drives the unions to set
higher wages but then the rms in order to deal with the higher labour costs,
will produce less ( @q

i
@wi
< 0). Hence the level of employment is reduced. On
the other hand, the unions in order to raise the number of employees (under
the threat of higher unemployment) and for values of the damage parameter
higher than the critical, will reduce the level of wages. Then the rms will
gain from the lower labour cost and will produce more, thus the level of the
employment is increasing.22
22See also Booth (1995) for more detail analysis on the unionspossible utilities.
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Proposition 4 a) The output (employment) is higher under the decentralised
structure than under the centralised but the wages are higher under the cen-
tralised structure. b) The optimum wages and output (employment) are char-
acterised by an inverse U-shape and an ordinary U-shape relation respectively
with respect to the values of the damage parameter.
3.2 Prots and unionsutility
Also the rmsprots are higher under decentralisation than under the cen-
tralised case. Therefore 
D
i > 
C
i for each e
2 < 9.23 So, according to the
results, the rms prefer bargaining over the wages with the unions at rm
level rather than under the single centralised union.
However the unionised structure o¤ers higher level of utility to the union
(or to the organised workers) than the decentralised structure. Specically,
U
C
i > U
D
i so, in this case, the unions have reasons to prefer one, single and
centralised union, than two di¤erent unions, in order to bargain with the
rms for the level of wages.
Proposition 5 The rms prefer the decentralised structure where the prots
are more but the unions prefer the centralised structure where the utility is
higher.
3.3 Technology and emissions
After some necessary calculations I obtain that the decentralised optimum
technology k
D
i is always lower than the centralised optimum technological
choice k
C
i for the given common conditions of the two models. Therefore the
rmstechnological choice under the decentralised unions is greener than the
optimum technology under the case of the single union.
23The decentralised prots are higher than the centralised for e2= < 44:05 but from
the conditions e2= < 9.
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Proposition 6 The rmstechnological choice is more green- less polluting-
under decentralisation than under the industry-wide union.
Actually the centralised structure, with wage discrimination, discourages
the rms to adopt a better technology and they prefer a more polluting
technology. Therefore, any movement, or change in the institutions of the
labour market, from decentralisation to centralisation will drive the rms to
adopt a worse (more polluting) technology.
Additionally, I compare the level of the emissions from each rm under
the case of the decentralised and centralised union structure. Interestingly,
the result depends on the size of the market. In particular, for markets size
less than 35A=eB where A = (501:62   e2(e2 + 14:86)) and B = (e3(e  
135)+1930:9e2), the level of the emissions under the centralised structure
is less than under the decentralised. However, for size of the market higher
than 35A=eB; the emissions are lower under decentralisation compared to
the emissions from the cenralised case. Thus, for relatively low markets size,
the pollution at industry level is lower under the industry-wide union and for
the opposite case the opposite holds.
Proposition 7 The level of the emissions is lower under the centralised
union than under the decentralised for relatively low markets size. For rela-
tively higher markets size (higher than 35A=eB) the decentralised structure
provides the lower level of emissions.
3.4 Simulations
In this subsection I calibrate the results in order to focus on the inuence of
the markets size on the level of the rmsemissions. Specically, for the same
and given values of the parameter e and  a small change in the markets
size can change signicantly the optimum results. In the next two tables
are included the numerical results for the case of the two union structure
(decentralised and centralised) when the size of the market changes from 7
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to 6 and for values of damage parameter equal to 4 and for parameter  equal
to 2. 24
Table 1: Simulations under relatively small size of the market
a = 6, e = 4,  = 2 Decentralised Centralised
k 0.38 0.6
q 0.99 0.6
 0.22 0.04
y 0.379 0.36
w 0.3 4.2
U 1.48 2.16
Table 2: Simulations under relatively large size of the market
a = 7, e = 4,  = 2 Decentralised Centralised
k 0.07 0.4
q 1.49 0.9
 0.50 0.09
y 0.107 0.36
w 2.52 4.3
U 3.33 4.86
It is obvious that for relatively small markets size (table 1, a = 6), un-
der the centralised structure the level of the emissions (y = 0:36) is lower
than under the decentralised case (y = 0:379). However, in the second case
(table 2) where the size of the market is larger than before (a = 7), under
decentralisation the rms will pollute less than under the centralised struc-
ture. Therefore, if the only objective of the decision maker is the reduction
of the emissions, then he prefers di¤erent union structure, according to the
size of the market. Hence, if it is possible to change the institutions in the
labour market, then the regulator prefers any change from large markets
24The specic values can satisfy the conditions of the two models.
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size to small to be accompanied with a transformation from decentralised to
centralised union structure.
4 Discussion and conclusions
In this paper I have examined how the di¤erent union structures (centralised
and decentralised) could inuence the rms environmental technological
choice when the unions care for environmental protection. Specically, I
assume that the unions focus not only on the level of wages and employment
but also on the reduction of the emissions which emanate from the rms
production as a by-product result.
The results with respect to the rms protability and unions wages
reconrm the theoretical and empirical results from previous studies. Par-
ticularly, the survey from Menezes-Filho and Van Reenen (2003) expressly
describes the previous argument Unions have a clear positive e¤ect on wages
and a clear negative e¤ect on protabilityp.26.
Additionally, the centralised (higher unionisation) structure, compared to
the decentralised, discourages the rmsadoption (or innovation) of a better
technology. This result agrees with the analogous results from the North
America studies (see Menezes-Filho and Van Reenen, 2003).
Moreover, in addition to the literature, I focus on the trade unionsstruc-
tures e¤ect on the level of the emissions. I argue that, the centralisation
could lead to lower level of pollution compared to the decentralisation for
relatively low size of the market. However, for relatively higher markets
size the decentralised structure could reduce the level of the rmspollution
more than the centralised case. This issue has been neglected by the empiri-
cal and theoretical studies (according to my knowledge) and therefore further
investigation may be reasonable.
Besides, there is an inverse U-shape relation between i) the level of pol-
lution and the size of the market and between ii) the optimum wages and
21
the damage parameter. Also, a U-shape exists between the optimum output
(employment) and the value of the damage parameter. Furthermore, the
union(s) set(s) higher level of wages the more polluting the rms technology
is.
Finally, if the regulators objective is the reduction of the rmspollution
then, he prefers a change in the union structure from decentralised to cen-
tralised, when the size of the market is relatively small. However for large
markets size, the decentralisation is preferable with respect to the environ-
mental protection.
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